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Does a Hierarchical Internet Necessitate
Multilateral Intervention?
Rob Frieden*
As the Internet matures and commercializes' it becomes more
hierarchical,2 particularly regarding the terms and conditions for
* J.D., 1980, University of Virginia; B.A., 1977, University of Pennsylvania.
Professor of Telecommunications, Pennsylvania State University.

"When the National Science Foundation commercialized the Internet between
1992 and 1994, it took what might be called a minimalist approach, allowing market
forces to develop the technology. It was a grand experiment with markets, and, by some
perspectives, an unusual way to develop infrastructure." Shane Greenstein, On the Net:
The Recent Commercialization of Access Infrastructure, IMP MAGAZINE (Dec. 22,
1999), at http://www.cisp.org/imp/december_99/12_99greenstein.htm.
2 [T]he providers of Internet connectivity [can] be classified as a loose
hierarchy broken down into roughly four tiers. At the top are nationwide (or
worldwide) Internet backbones, which provide nationwide Internet services
using extensive owned or leased fiber facilities. They generally have peering
arrangements or private peering connections with the other national backbone
providers and are "transit-free," so they do not have to rely on transit
agreements. UUNET (owned by WorldCom) and iMCI are examples of these
large national backbone providers. The second group of providers are national
Internet backbone networks that use facilities leased from underlying fiber
telecommunications providers, but which pay transit fees to one or more
national backbone providers. A third group comprises the Regional or local ISP
Internet connectivity providers, which lease some regional or local network
fiber facilities and equipment and interconnect with other small providers at the
public NAPs make up another category. They typically purchase transit
backbone services from any of the national backbone providers. The last group
is made up of ISPs that do not have a network, but instead rely on others for
wholesale Internet connectivity services. Small "Mom & Pop" ISPs are typical
of this type.
Constance K. Robinson, Network Effects in Telecommunications Mergers, MCI
Worldcom Merger: Protecting the Future of the Internet, in TELECOM DEALS: M&A,
REGULATORY AND FINANCING IssuEs

517, 535-36 (Kraus et al. eds., 2000); see also

Robert M. Frieden, Without Public Peer: The Potential Regulatory and Universal
Service Consequences of Internet Balkanization, 3 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8 (1998), at
http://vjolt.student.virginia.edu/graphics/vol3/homeart8.html; Robert M. Frieden, Last
Days of the Free Ride? The Consequences of Settlement-Based Interconnectionfor the
Internet, 1 INFO No. 3, 225-38 (1999).
The result of technological advancement in telephony markets is a regulatory
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network interconnection between Internet Service Providers
(ISPs).3 The previous "democratic" Sender Keep All (SKA)
system promoted positive networking externalities,5 but also
gap between conventional service providers and service providers that use new
Internet technologies. As the technologies mature, both traditional market issues
and concerns regarding regulatory controls are increasingly raised by
competitors as well as regulatory agencies. The reluctance to regulate the new
telecommunications technologies is based in the fear that the technology is not
mature enough to bear the burden of regulation.
Seth A. Cohen, Deregulating, Defragmenting & Interconnecting: Reconsidering
Commercial Telecommunications Regulation in Relation to the Rise of Internet
Telephony, 18 J.L. & COM. 133, 147 (1998).
3 Internet Service Providers typically provide the necessary telecommunications
link to the Internet, such as local seven-digit telephone numbers. Additionally, they may
provide some content and offer additional services, such as electronic mail addresses.
4 Taunya L. McLarty, Liberalized Telecommunications Trade in the WTO:
Implications for Universal Service Policy, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 41 n.203 (1998).
"Sender Keep All" and "Bill and Keep" arrangements refer to the absence of a monetary
transfer when ISPs agree to route the traffic of another ISP to yet another ISP (also
known as transiting), or to the final recipient. These terms also refer to a business
relationship among telecommunications carriers: "Each carrier sets consumer collection
rates and keeps 100%. This allows new entrants, but it does not encourage operators to
receive calls because no compensation is given to allow incoming calls over their
system." Id. ISPs may use the term "peering" or "true peering" to identify a "Sender
Keep All" or "Bill and Keep" arrangement. Currently, peering typically occurs only
when ISPs of equal size expect to route roughly equivalent traffic streams. In practice,
peering now occurs only among large ISPs with extensive transmission facilities and
traffic volumes. Id.
I A positive network externality exists when the cost incurred by a user of the
Internet does not fully reflect the benefit derived with the addition of new users and
points of communications. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization,
Compatibilityand Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70, 70 (1985); Michael L. Katz & Carl
Shapiro, Network Externalities,Competition and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 424,
426 (1985). Positive network externalities refer to an accrual in value, including
increased access to information, increased ease of communication, and a decrease in a
variety of transaction and overhead costs. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F.
Supp. 2d 9, 20 (D.D.C. 1999) (findings of fact) ("A positive network effect is a
phenomenon by which the attractiveness of a product increases with the number of
people using it."); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000)
(conclusions of law); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000)
(final judgment), petitionfor cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3111 (U.S. July 26, 2000); CARL
SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK
ECONOMY 183-84 (1999); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of
Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REv. 481, 483 (1998); Peter S. Menell, An
Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protectionfor Application Programs,41 STAN. L.
REv. 1045, 1066 n.119 (1989) ("'network externality' describes a class of goods for
which the utility.., derived from the good's consumption increases with the number of
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generated free rider opportunities6 and great potential for network
congestion, particularly at "public peering" sites where ISPs of
any size could secure interconnection with other ISPs at low cost.7
The individual networks that make up the Internet remain well
integrated, but a more hierarchical pricing arrangement has
developed.8 Now only the largest ISPs continue to "peer" on a
other persons consuming the good"); Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries,7
GEO. MASON L. REv. 673 (1999).
6 Free ridership refers to the ability to tap into valuable services without having to
pay. In some instances, service providers consider free ridership unavoidable and even a
social benefit, similar to the manner in which advertiser-supported commercial television
makes it possible for consumption of high-cost content without a direct payment and
without indirect payment through consumption of the products and services advertised.
Digital technology, however, greatly exacerbates the free ridership problem as one can
cheaply and easily make perfect duplicates of valuable intellectual property not intended
for free use. The Internet provides a cheap medium for widespread dissemination of
purloined content. "Bringing social order to the Internet thus requires overcoming free
rider problems similar to those necessary to bring order to the west." Andrew P. Morriss,
Miners, Vigilantes & Cattlemen: Overcoming Free Rider Problems in the Private
Provision of Law, 33 LAND & WATER L. REv. 581, 688 (1998); see also Alvord-Polk,
Inc. v. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996, 1010-11 (3d Cir. 1994) (denying summary
judgment for defendants on antitrust claims that wallpaper vendors accessible by tollfree telephone numbers constituted "free riders" of full service vendors who incur the
cost of creating and distributing wallpaper sample books, salesperson advice, and
showroom displays) (citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36,55
(1977)); Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1376-77 (3d
Cir. 1992).
7 A peering arrangement describes the situation where firms exchange data
traffic without charging one another (bill-and-keep). A local peering
arrangement is when the exchange occurs at a site close to the end-users. This
proximity essentially improves the performance and speeds of the Internet
connection, as data traffic travels less distance.

Deborah A. Lathen,

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, CABLE SERVICES BUREAU,

Broadband Today, 59 n. 128 (1999), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/
Reports/.
8 Robinson, supra note 2, at 531-32.
At the beginning of [Internet] privatization, most of the networks had peering
agreements with each other. With the massive growth of the Internet, the...
[public peering points also known as Network Access Points] became
congested, slowing down the speed of the connection and resulting in more lost
data, and lowering the quality of connection to the rest of the networks. The
larger networks responded to this problem by investing in private dedicated
connection points which provide faster and more accurate connections.
Generally, only the big national networks have these private peering connection
points. Over time, as individual networks grew, large nationwide backbone
providers began to complain that small local or regional ISPs were free riding
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SKA basis, while demanding payment from smaller operators.9
Requiring smaller ISPs to pay for access to larger ISPs'
networks constitutes a rational business transaction and reflects a
maturing, more businesslike attitude among ISPs. However, it
constitutes a significant change in circumstances and imposes
substantial new costs on smaller ISPs, some of which object to
what they consider a one-sided exploitation of superior bargaining
power.' ° No matter how justified and efficiency enhancing on a
macro-level, the commercial, unregulated nature of ISP
interconnection negotiations now requires sizeable transfer
payments where none previously existed." Much of the payments
flow to Tier-1 ISPs located in North America, leading some ISPs
and their governments in other locales to claim that the transfer
payments violate international trade, antitrust, and economic
development policies.'2 North American ISPs and governments
on the large providers' substantial network investments. To deal with the free
riding issues, the larger network providers began to create policies to restrict
future peering arrangements with small and regional ISPs that had not invested
in growing their networks. They stopped peering and entered into transit
agreements where the national backbones charged the small network or ISP
"transit fees" for carrying and terminating their traffic.
Id.
9 Id.

'o Id. "In essence, the smaller [ISP] networks became customers of the larger
ones." Id. at 532.
11 Id.
12 International Charging Arrangements for Internet Services, Australia's
Objectives for the Project, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Telecommunications
Working Group, 19th Meeting, PLEN/G/03, at http://www.apii.or.kr/apec/atwgl
previous.html?apec-previous-select= 19&apec-previous-select2--03&x= 14&y=l (Mar.
2, 1999). For example, at the request of several Asia-Pacific governments, the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation Telecommunications Working Group initiated an inquiry
into International Charging Arrangements for Internet Services (ICAIS). Representatives
of the Australian government and commercial Internet ventures asserted the need for
"equitable distribution of costs and benefits, including return on investment. The model
should encourage effective working of open markets in the relevant services and
facilities. It should also work in situations where closed markets interconnect with open
markets." Id. On the other hand, representatives of the United States government and
commercial Internet ventures stated "that cost efficient arrangements for Internet traffic
will continue to be worked out most quickly if the Internet market is left unhampered."
U.S. Background Paper: International Charging Arrangementsfor Internet Services
(ICAIS), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Telecommunications Working Group, 19th
Meeting, PLEN/G/03, at http://www.apii.or.kr/apec/atwg/previous.html?apec-previous-
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have responded by emphasizing the commercial nature of Internet
peering and the rationale for not extending burdensome and
unnecessary "legacy regulation.'""
This article will explore the nature of the Internet
interconnection dispute with an eye toward examining the
strategies
used to
raise
the issue in
multilateral
telecommunications and trade policy forums like the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO)."' The article will also consider several future
scenarios and whether the problem will abate or intensify. 5 This
consideration involves an assessment of whether Internet traffic
flow and content will more substantially diverge from a North
American centrality and whether interconnection arrangements
will become even more finely calibrated. 6
I. Marketplace Consequences of a Hierarchical Internet
As Internet industry segments mature, many governments
wind down and eventually terminate their role as incubator and
anchor tenant. In many nations, including the United States,
governments helped promote Internet use and proliferation of the
select=l9&apecpreviousselect2=03&x=14&y=l (Feb. 22, 1999); Dan Lundberg,
AT&T Position Regarding Internet ChargingMechanisms and the Development of the
Asia-Pacific Internet Infrastructure, submitted by the United States of America, AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation Telecommunications Working Group, 19th Meeting,
PLEN/G/02, available at http://www.apii.or.kr/apec/atwg/previous.html?apecprevious-select=19&apec.previous-select2=03&x=14&y=l (Feb. 22, 1999).
13 MICHAEL KENDE, THE DIGITAL HANDSHAKE: CONNECTING INTERNET BACKBONES,

(FCC, Office of Plans and Policy, Working Paper No. 32, 2000), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/opp/workingp.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2001).
In recent years, some carriers, particularly those from the Asia-Pacific region,
have claimed that it is unfair that they must pay for the whole cost of the
transmission capacity between international points and the United States that is
used to carry Internet traffic between these regions. After analyzing the case
presented by these carriers, the paper concludes that the solution proposed by
these carriers, legacy international telecommunications regulations, should not
be imposed on the Internet.
Id.; see also JASON OXMAN, THE FCC AND THE UNREGULATION OF THE INTERNET, (FCC,
Office of Plans and Policy, Working Paper No. 31, 1999), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/opp/workingp.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2001).
14 See infra Parts I-III, V.C.3-4.
1 See infra Part IV.
16

See infra Part V.
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Internet infrastructure." Having concluded that the Internet has
reached a critical mass, most governments now endorse the view
that a largely commercial and private environment will best serve
the national interest. 8 Most governments now favor a privatized
Internet, but not an environment that one could deem completely
unregulated. 9 As the Internet becomes a major medium for a
variety of private and commercial transactions, activities
previously considered illegal or warranting government oversight
will also trigger government involvement.
The privatized, commercial Internet 2' has evidenced economic
17ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd., Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844 (1997).
The Internet had its origins in 1969 as an experimental project of the Advanced
Research Project Agency ("ARPA"), and was called ARPANET. This network
linked computers and computer networks owned by the military, defense
contractors, and university laboratories conducting defense-related research.
The network later allowed researchers across the country to access directly and
to use extremely powerful supercomputers located at a few key universities and
laboratories. As it evolved far beyond its research origins in the United States to
encompass universities, corporations and people around the world ....

Id.
The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers. It is the
outgrowth of what began in 1969 as a military program called "ARPANET,"
which was designed to enable computers operated by the military, defense
contractors, and universities conducting defense-related research to
communicate with one another by redundant channels even if some portions of
the network were damaged in a war. While the ARPANET no longer exists, it
provided an example for the development of a number of civilian networks that,
eventually linking with each other, now enable tens of millions of people to
communicate with one another and to access vast amounts of information from
around the world.
ACLU, 521 U.S. at 849-50.
18 For a helpful analysis of present and future challenges to Internet development,
see COMMITTEE ON THE INTERNET IN THE EVOLVING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE,
COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD, THE INTERNET'S COMING OF

AGE (2000), availableat http://bob.nap.edu/books/0309069920/html/ (last visited Feb. 5,
2001).
19 For background on the development of the Internet's business structure, see
KEVIN WERBACH, DIGITAL TORNADO: THE INTERNET AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY

(FCC, Office of Plans and Policy, Working Paper No. 29, 1997), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/opp/workingp.html.
20 Id.
Over the near-term, the Internet and the PSTN will begin to look
increasingly similar with overlapping functions. As the Internet matures, ISPs
21
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characteristics similar to those of telecommunication networks."
Tier-1 ISPs have accrued favorable economies of scale 2' and
scope" through growth in both customer base and the inventory of
bandwidth available for service. 5 Having made the investment to
accommodate burgeoning demand, Tier-1 ISPs must find new
profit centers in addition to monthly subscriptions. 26 These
operators have found they can efficiently provide many Internetmediated services, including electronic commerce and advertisersupported access to desirable content, and also force smaller ISPs,
which have not achieved similar growth or expanded their
bandwidth inventory, to pay for access and transit services.
To achieve positive economies of scale and scope,
telecommunications and Internet operators alike have worked to
expand their customer base, available bandwidth, number of
interconnection sites, and the content that they host, as opposed to

will become more diversified and universal peering arrangements will become
less practicable. The need for "settlements," at least with respect to some
functions, will arise. Universal service contributions will be difficult to escape,
particularly for phone-to-phone [Internet-mediated telephony] that utilizes
IP-based packet-switching over dedicated facilities, but does not necessarily
actually utilize the public Internet. Over the long term, however, the real issue is
not whether IP Telephony and basic voice telephony are consistently regulated
according to familiar PSTN concepts.
Aileen A. Pisciotta, Regulation of International Communications in the Age of the
Internet: Lagging Behind the Future, 33 INT'L LAW. 367, 371 (1999).
22 For a helpful background on the nature of telecommunications regulation in the
context of competition policy, see Michel Kerf & Damien Geradin, ControllingMarket
Power in Telecommunications: Antitrust vs. Sector-Specific Regulation, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 919 (1999).
23 Economies of scale refer to the "[rieductions in the average cost of a product in
the long run resulting from an expanded level of output." THE MIT DICTIONARY OF
MODERN ECONOMICS 122 (4th ed. 1992).
24 Economies of scope refer to the condition that occurs "when it is cheaper for one
firm to produce multiple, related products rather than for independent companies to
make them separately." Business Basics Online, at http://www.multimedia.calpoly.edu/
development/busen/alpha/e/economy_ofscope.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2001).
25 Pisciotta, supra note 21.
See, e.g., Melanie Austria Farmer, ISPs Dipping into Data Storage to Stay
Ahead, CNET News.com, at http://www.canada.cnet.com/news/0-1004-200-2198186
.html (July 3, 2000).
27 Robinson, supra note 2, at 532.
26
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providing access to content hosted elsewhere.28 Massive, multibillion dollar mergers and acquisitions evince the desire to achieve
scale and scope economies in a speedy fashion-acquiring the
market share of a competitor, rather than migrating customers and
revenues from competitors. 29 The quest to achieve scale and scope
economies constitutes one of the major reasons the Internet has
become more hierarchical," with a small set of major carriers
operating the key backbone routes and capturing a large market
share measured by bandwidth, number of subscribers, minutes of
use, revenues, number of discrete "hits" to internal web sites, or
number of discrete Domain Numbering System sites internal to
("hosted" by) the network." The small number of major backbone
ISPs, coupled with an increasingly commercial orientation, has
made it possible for the Tier-i ISPs to demand and secure
payments2 from smaller ISPs for access to their networks and
content.1
Without concluding whether a more hierarchical Internet
promotes greater economies of scale and scope, the concentration
of Tier-1 ISPs' market share has made it possible to secure a
superior bargaining position vis-A-vis smaller ISPs:
As the cooperative, nonprofit ethos of the Internet began to fade,
however, some providers began to have second thoughts about
connecting directly to one another [through open peering].
Today, large backbone providers such as AT&T, Cable &
Wireless, GTE, PSINet, Sprint, Qwest Communications, and
UUNET consider one another peers and don't hesitate to
connect to each other. However, they often spurn
28

See id.

29

Id.

30 For additional background on the impact of a hierarchical Internet industry

structure on universal service policy objectives, see Frieden, Last Days of the Free
Ride?, supra note 2, at 225-38; Frieden, Without Public Peer, supra note 2.
31 For a compilation of statistics on ISPs, see Directory of Internet Service
Providers (12th ed. 2000), BOARDWATCH MAGAZINE, at http://www.ispworld.com/isp/
TOC.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2001); see also ISP Statistics, BOARDWATCH MAGAZINE, at
http://www.ispworld.com/src/ISPStatistics.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2001).
32 See, e.g., WorldCom Policy for Settlement-Free Interconnection with Internet
Networks, UUNET, at http://www2.uu.net/peering/ (Jan. 2001). For example, UUNET, a
major Tier-I ISP, will interconnect with another ISP on a SKA peering basis if the ISP
meets certain requirements with respect to geographic scope, traffic exchange ratio,
backbone capacity, and traffic volume. Id.
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smaller nationwide providers. . .."

While technical and operational factors do impact the Tier-1
ISPs' interconnection decision-making process, the "main reason
for not peering, however, is economic."3 Some observers suggest
that marketplace-driven negotiations should never trigger
government scrutiny, while others would argue the legitimacy of
antitrust or competition policy analysis when assessing the terms
and conditions for Internet access.35
A. Does a Small Set of Tier-i ISPs Reduce Consumer
Welfare?
Assessing whether Internet access pricing triggers the need for
government involvement requires an examination of whether
consumers suffer when a small number of backbone ISPs agree to
restrict SKA "true peering." Such an assessment involves an
examination of ISP market share and the state of competition over
all components in a complete Internet link, including local access
to the subscriber's ISP and the local ISP's links with other ISPs for
access to the rest of the world both in terms of telecommunications
carriage and content creation or dissemination. In general, a
healthy and efficiently operating Internet industry can exise6 even
under a hierarchical structure coupled with a limited number of
Tier-i ISPs.37 This finding requires some qualification, however,

33 Jonathan Angel, Toll Lanes on the Information Superhighway, NETWORK
MAGAZINE

(Feb. 1, 2000), at http://www.networkmagazine.com/art/.

Id.
See generally ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 377 (W. Kip Viscusi
et al. eds., 2d ed. 1998). For background on U.S. antitrust law and policy, see HERBERT
34
35

HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE

(1994); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8 (1976);
Georges J. Alexander, Antitrust and the Telephone Industry after the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 227
(1996). For background on antitrust and telecommunications-specific rules in the
European telecommunications markets, see Paul Nihoul, Convergence in European
Telecommunications: A Case Study on the Relationship Between Regulation and
Competition Law, 2INT'L J. COM. L. & POL'Y 1 (1998).
36 See Tom Downes & Shane Greenstein, Do Commercial ISPs Provide Universal
Access?, in COMPETITION, REGULATION AND CONVERGENCE: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE
1998 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH COMMITTEE (Sharon Gillett & Ingo
Vogelsang eds., 1998).
37 KENDE, supra note 13.
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as bottlenecks can exist in the Internet topology within a region.38
Likewise, the potential does exist for price squeezes-the ability
of one competitor to raise the costs of others for a service element
needed by all competitors and supplied by one or few operators.39
It is important to recognize that a hierarchical Internet
industrial structure results in different types of ISPs incurring
different costs for access to both content and carriage."0 Such price
differentials have triggered the Internet access pricing dispute
because some stakeholders consider differences in the cost of
Internet access evidence of price gouging and anticompetitive
conduct by the Tier-1 ISPs." Others note that no ISP has
In conclusion, the presence of a large number of top-tier backbones can prevent
any anti-competitive actions. In a competitive backbone market, no large
backbone would unilaterally end peering with another, as it has no guarantee
that it will benefit from such an action. Furthermore, there would be no
insurmountable barrier to entry or growth of smaller backbones. Larger top-tier
backbones would continue to compete to provide transit services to smaller
backbones. These smaller backbones would be able to resell these services to
their own customers, and would not seem to face any barrier to acquiring either
the infrastructure or customer base that could enable them eventually to join the
ranks of the larger backbones and qualify for peering. Actual, as well as
potential, entry by new backbones would act to constrain the actions of larger
incumbent backbones, keeping prices at competitive levels.
Id.
38 See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000)
(reversing lower court's grant of summary judgment that municipal cable television
franchising authority may condition transfer of a franchise on the cable operator
providing competing ISPs with open access to its broadband network). For example,
when cable television companies provide Internet access, they incur no compulsory
obligation to provide access to any ISP as would be the case if a telephone company
common carrier provided such access. AT&T, the largest cable television service
provider, typically only provides direct access to a preferred ISP, Excite@Home. Id.
39 KENDE, supra note 13; United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,
437-38 (2d Cir. 1945) (articulating the following four-part test for price squeezes: (1) a
firm has monopoly power with respect to one product; (2) its price for that product is
higher than a "fair price"; (3) that product is required to compete in a second market
where the monopolist itself competes; and (4) the monopolist's price in the second
market is so low that competitors cannot match it and still earn a "living profit").
40 Jack Rickard, Editor's Notes, BOARDWATCH MAGAZINE, May 1998, at
http://www.ispworld.com/ (on file with author). For example, telecommunications
transmission costs have not become completely distance insensitive. ISPs located farther
from the server on which content is hosted typically incur higher telecommunications
transmissions costs than closer ISPs.

41

Id.
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42
experienced an inability to secure interconnection.
Without offering an opinion on the equities involved in
different access terms and conditions, several major causes for the
difference exist.
First, the facilities-based, long-haul telecommunications
transmission marketplace has such substantial market entry and
operational costs that relatively few operators can efficiently and
effectively enter and remain in the market. This view, supported
by an empirical analysis of the telecommunications infrastructure
and its ownership, contrasts with the comparatively low costs and
low barriers to market entry in reselling the long-haul services of a
Tier-1 ISP. 3
Second, the nature of Internet access, from a consumer (enduser) point of view seamlessly blends access to content and the
telecommunications transport needed to acquire and deliver the
content. Users expect their ISPs to deliver content quickly and
effectively regardless of where the content is physically hosted.
Third, ISPs recover the cost of Internet-mediated content and
the telecommunications transport costs without separately
itemizing or disaggregating these costs. With the proliferation of
Internet-mediated services triggering the need for ever-increasing
telecommunications transport costs, ISPs have augmented
revenues from end-user subscriptions with revenue streams from
advertisers, a share of electronic commerce revenues and where
possible, payments from other ISPs for transiting their networks.
Fourth, traffic flows and, more importantly, end-user demand
for content and Internet-mediated services, directly impact the
terms and conditions for Internet access." ISPs offering superior

42 KENDE, supra note 13. "[Pleering arrangements are the result of commercial
negotiations; each backbone [operator] bases its decisions on whether, how and where to
peer by weighing the benefits and costs of entering into a particular interconnection
agreement with another backbone." Id.
43 Jonathan Weinberg, The Internet and "Telecommunications Services,"
Universal Service Mechanisms, Access Charges, and Other Flotsam of the Regulatory
System, 16 YALEJ. ON REG. 211 (1999).
44 See Geoff Huston, Interconnection, Peering, and Settlements, Proc. of the 9th
Ann. Conf. of the Internet Soc'y, at http://www.isoc.org/inet99/longtoc.htm (last visited
Feb. 5, 2001); for more extensive background on the importance of traffic volumes and
flow, see GEOFF HUSTON, ISP SURVIVAL GUIDE: STRATEGIES FOR RUNNING A
COMPETITIVE ISP (1998).
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content or content delivery options can demand and fetch premium
compensation, the product of commercial negotiation that factors
in demand and supply elasticities as well as consumer expectations
regarding quality of service."5
An FCC Working Paper on Internet Peering concludes that
Tier-1 ISP denial of cost-free interconnection with smaller ISPs
does not demonstrate a strategy to drive out competitors or raise
their costs.46 Larger ISPs may seek to prevent free riding by
smaller ISPs, who, for example, may disproportionately use the
larger ISP's network. 7 In addition, they may seek to generate new
transit revenue streams from smaller ISPs by providing access to
their network and the networks of other ISPs with which they have
peering arrangements.48
B. Subjecting the Internet Market Structure to Traditional
Antitrust or Competition Policy Analysis
Traditional antitrust or competition policy analysis considers
individual firms in the context of the markets in which they
operate with an eye toward determining whether and how a firm
might engage in anticompetitive and market distorting behavior.49
45 THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS, supra note 23, at 342 (stating
that price elasticity of demand refers to the "responsiveness of the quantity demanded of
a good to its own price"); see also INTERNET ECONOMICS (Lee W. McKnight & Joseph P.
Bailey eds., 1998).
46 KENDE, supra note 13. "[T]he presence of a large number of top-tier backbones

can prevent any anticompetitive actions." Id.
41 Id. "One reason a backbone may refuse to peer is that it believes that peering
would enable their other backbone to free ride on its infrastructure investments." Id.
48 See id.
49 See, e.g., Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists' Illegal Conduct Under
The Sherman Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 809, 810 (2000).

The most significant antitrust cases of the last century have been brought under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act (Section 2), which makes it illegal for a firm to
"monopolize, or attempt to monopolize," interstate commerce. In cases
involving the Standard Oil Company, the Aluminum Company of America
(Alcoa), IBM, AT&T, and Eastman Kodak, the federal courts have established
certain basic principles of monopoly regulation. Decisively rejecting the notion
that monopolies should be deemed illegal in and of themselves, the courts have
found monopolists liable under Section 2 only when they have engaged in
predatory conduct.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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This analysis has two major tasks: the macro-level definition of
the relevant product or service and geographical markets," and the
micro-level assessment of individual firm market share and
potential to
engage in practices that harm competitors and
5

consumers. 1
Traditional antitrust or competition policy analysis emphasizes
the following: (1) a vertical examination primarily of individual
firm behavior"2 and its impact on competition and consumer
welfare; 3 and (2) a horizontal examination of conduct occurring
between actors, including conspiracies in restraint of trade." In the
matter of Internet peering, complaints have addressed decisions by
several Tier-i ISPs to require payments for interconnection and
transit services." Even though the Tier-1 ISP market may evidence
some concentration, no single carrier has acquired, or attempted to
acquire, a monopoly. 6 As no unilateral conduct by a single firm is
50 Bob Rowe, Substance Plus Process-Telecom Regulation Reforms to Protect
Consumers, Preserve Universal Service, and Promote Competition in 2000: A New
Regulatory Regime for Federal-State Relations and Universal Service Support, 71 U.
COLO. L. REv. 879, 888 (2000).
Market concentration measurements typically examine the relevant geographic
market, relevant product market, number of firms participating in the market,
and the market share of each firm to produce a number which may be used to
compare the concentration of markets, the change in concentration over time, or
the possible change in concentration if a particular transaction occurs.

Id.
5' See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir.
1945) (finding that 90% market share constituted monopoly power, but that it was
doubtful if 60% would be enough, and "certainly" 33% would not be enough).
52 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). The Sherman Act prohibits monopolization, attempts to
monopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize. Id. No evidence exists that any single
Tier-I ISP has market power or has conspired with other Tier-I ISPs to achieve market
domination collectively by coordinating a single peering policy.
51 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). The
antitrust laws protect competition, not specific, individual competitors. Id.
54 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). The Sherman Act condemns all contracts, combinations,
and conspiracies in restraint of trade. Id. Other U.S. federal statutes addressing horizontal
anticompetitive conduct include the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (2000) and the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
55 See, e.g., KENDE, supra note 13 ("In recent years, a number of non-U.S. carriers
have objected to interconnection agreements governing flows of Internet traffic between
international points and the United States.").
56 Id. ("In conclusion, the presence of a large number of top-tier backbones can
prevent any anticompetitive actions.").
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implicated, a horizontal examination is necessary.
C. Defining the Relevant Product/Serviceand Geographical
Market
How one defines the market for Internet access and Internetmediated services directly affects conclusions as to whether the
market is robustly competitive or subject to market power and
domination by the Tier-1 ISPs. Any definition of Internet markets
should consider the functional equivalency or substitutability of a
product or service in determining the "relevant" product or service
market. 7 Markets can be defined as including all goods and
services considered by consumers to constitute an alternative to
the others. 8 Economists and courts considering antitrust cases
typically measure the substitutability of products and services in
terms of cross-elasticities. 9
Internet access and Internet-mediated services constitute
elements of the single, broader market for bandwidth capable of
transporting digital bitstreams. ° Digitization makes it possible to
assemble and deliver a variety of different types of services over a
single medium.6' While all bits do not have the same function or
57 Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on

Antitrust, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1805, 1831-33 (1990); see also U.S. Department of Justice
& Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992, as amended 1997),
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104.
58 Satellite Television v. Cont'l Cablevision, Inc., 714 F.2d 351, 355 (4th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1027 (1984).
59 Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 469 (1992).
Cross-elasticity of demand between products is defined as "the extent to which
consumers will change their consumption of one product in response to a price change in
another." Id.; see also HOVENKAMP, supranote 35, at § 3.2 (1994) ("A relevant market is
the smallest grouping of sales for which the elasticity of demand and supply are
sufficiently low that a firm with 100% of that grouping could profitably reduce output
and increase price substantially above marginal cost."); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville
Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327-28 (1961) ("[T]he threatened foreclosure of competition
must be in relation to the market related.").
60 For a helpful technical background on the Internet, see Lance J. Hoffman et al.,
How the Internet Works, Cyberspace Policy Institute, at http://www.cpi.seas.gwu.edu/
library/papers.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2001). The Internet transports traffic representing
many different types of content, such as text, graphics, audio, and video. All content is
converted into digital bitstreams for transport. Id.
61 See also Russ Haynal, Internet: "The Big Picture," at http://www.navigators
.com/internetarchitecture.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2001).
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value, a data transport pipe, like that owned and operated by the

Tier-i ISPs (or their telecommunications carrier parent or
affiliate), can serve as the medium for delivering a variety of
Internet-mediated services and the bitstreams they generate.62
Accordingly, an appropriate market definition considers long-haul
data transport via telecommunications. Given the international
nature of the Internet topology, a global geographical market
seems appropriate for purposes of assessing the potential for
market domination and anticompetitive practices.
D. Individual or Collective Behavior of Firms-Evidence of
Market Power
Having defined the overall service market and the
geographical nature of the market, antitrust or competition policy
then requires an examination of the companies serving these
markets.63 This examination considers whether and how one or
more firms have market power-ability to affect the price or
supply of one or more elements that make up international data
transport services.64 The appearance of market power correlates
with firm size and market penetration, but a finding of market
power does not result simply because one firm has a large market

share and large capitalization.65 Some markets operate efficiently
and competitively, despite the fact that a few large enterprises
have captured a dominant market share.66 On the other hand, one
small, thinly capitalized enterprise might have a near monopoly in
a market narrowly defined by type or locality.67
In examining the international data transport marketplace, one
can see that a dichotomy exists in terms of market entry costs 8 and
62

Id.

63 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
64 THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN EcONOMICS, supra note 23, at 268 (defining
market power as the "ability of a single, or group of buyer(s) or seller(s) to influence the
price of the product or service in which it is trading").
65 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).

See, e.g., FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich.
1996) (holding that a merger of hospitals resulted in permissible market concentration).
67 See, e.g., Peter Bowman Rutledge, A Brief Review of Merger Control in the
66

United States, 13 INT'L L. PRACTICUM 8, 10 (2000).
barriers to market entry may overcome evidence of market
68 Low
anticompetitiveness. See, e.g., FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 55
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opportunities for local and regional ISPs on one hand, and longhaul, national and international ISPs on the other hand.69 This
dichotomy underscores the importance of the baseline market
definition exercise because one might infer market power based on
high market share in narrowly defined markets, while another
might infer no market share based on a diluted market penetration
when using a larger market definition.
Perhaps the commercial aviation marketplace provides a
helpful example of a similarly dichotomous market. Relatively
few financial and other barriers exist to prevent the creation of a
new airline. With a handful of airplanes, leased by a fully
leveraged venture, new airlines can enter the marketplace. Absent
barriers to accessing airport terminal and landing space, the airline
can serve a few routes and provide significant competition to
incumbents already on those routes. No one would mistake this
small and incremental competition, however, as a threat to the
financial viability of a major incumbent carrier's services. For
example, a nation like the United States may have hundreds of
national airlines, but still have only six major carriers controlling
over seventy percent of the total market as measured by industryappropriate criteria.
Depending on one's perspective and market definitions, the
commercial aviation marketplace in the United States can be
characterized
as robustly competitive or oligopolistic
notwithstanding low barriers to market entry and a general
downturn in overall rates since deregulation stimulated market
(D.D.C. 1998) ("A court's finding that there exists ease of entry into the relevant product
market can be sufficient to offset the government's prima facie case of
anticompetitiveness."); United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121,
149 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) ("A merger is not likely to cause an anti-competitive effect if other
participants can enter the relevant markets and reduce the likelihood of a price increase
above competitive levels."); United States v. United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064, 1071
(D. Del. 1991) ("United Tote's second argument is that it is so easy to enter the totalistor
market that high market share does not accurately reflect an ability to exercise market
power."); McCaw Pers. Communications, Inc. v. Pac. Telesis Group, 645 F. Supp. 1166,
1174 (N.D. Cal. 1986) ("The existence of low barriers to entry may rebut a prima facie
showing of illegality, even where the combined market share of the merged firms is quite
high.").
69 KENDE, supra note 13. Market costs vary substantially between operating as a
local or regional Internet Service Provider and operating a major Tier-I ISP backbone.
Given quite low market entry costs, over 4,000 ISPs operate in the United States.
However, only about forty also qualify as Tier-I backbone operators. Id. at Figures 7, 8.
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entry. Despite the absence of bottlenecks in terms of access to
capital, airport terminal space, and runway landing slots, few

airlines compete for long-haul traffic or offer a thoroughly
national and international route system.
One would have a harder time justifying the view that a few
ventures dominate the market for Internet access and Internet
services if these markets were defined in the context of the total
number of ventures pursuing some aspect or element of the multifaceted international data transport marketplace. Conversely, a
narrower definition of the Internet marketplace, emphasizing the
market share held by Tier-1 ISPs, could support the view that
these operators share market power and the ability to extract high
rates while imposing "unfair" terms and conditions.
The Internet marketplace does share certain elements with the
commercial aviation marketplace. While a nation might have
hundreds, if not thousands, of ISPs, the overall market segments
into a large percentage of total ISPs serving single localities or
regions, with a limited number of ISPs operating the major longhaul backbone networks needed for national and international
services.7 ° The startup costs for local ISPs evidence limited
barriers to market entry. A new ISP can enter the marketplace
simply by leasing a few local trunks from the local exchange
carrier to provide subscribers with access to a modem bank for
access to and from the Internet, secured by the interconnection of
those local lines with a few inter-exchange carrier lines that access
the transit services of a larger ISP in terms of size and reach.7'
On the other hand, a major backbone Internet operator does
not appear overnight. These Tier-1 operators must have the
financial and operational wherewithal to construct or lease and
manage a nationwide network of high capacity lines. Few
enterprises can amass the needed investment and skills.
Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that most of the
Internet Tier-1 ISPs are subsidiaries or affiliates of major
telecommunication carriers.72
70 See Hoffman et al., supra note 60.
71

See id.

72 Bill McCarthy, Introduction to the Directory of Internet Service Providers, 12th
Edition, BOARDWATCH MAGAZINE, at http://www.ispworld.com/isp/Introduction.htm

(last visited Feb. 5, 2001). Using number of interconnection as a measure of market
dominance, Broadwatch magazine ranks UUNET, an MCI WorldCom subsidiary, as the
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Using the global geographical market definition and
characterizing the relevant service market as one involving data
transport, the existence of a small number of Tier- 1 ISPs can raise
questions about the potential for the exercise of market power. No
empirical evidence supports the view, however, that such market
power exists. A unilateral decision by one or more Tier-1 ISPs to
eliminate open, public peering does not, by itself, constitute an
exercise of market power or an anticompetitive practice.73 While
such a decision raises the cost of doing business for smaller ISPs,
it may reflect legitimate business judgment rather than a concerted
effort to drive smaller ISPs out of the market, thereby reducing the
supply of ISP services despite the growing demand for Internet
services and bandwidth. Decisions regarding whether and how to
peer do not necessarily reflect the exercise of market power."
Likewise, the peering decisions of Tier-1 carriers do not directly
impact the supply of bandwidth." A peering decision typically
does not directly impact a telecommunication carrier's decisions
of whether and when to deploy additional satellite or submarine
cable transmission capacity.76 A peering decision may have a
direct impact on the price of Internet services to consumers, but
many factors impact pricing decisions and one would need to
conduct further analysis to conclude that a change in peering
policy constituted the primary reason for an increase in end-user
prices.
II. Exercise of Market Power in Anticompetitive Ways
We have seen that dominant market share serves as a primary
potential indicator of market power. Other indicators exist,
leading ISP with a 23.93% market share, followed by Sprint with 13.5%, and Cable &
Wireless with 7.45% of the market. AT&T, Genuity (formerly GTE Internetworking),
Verio (a subsidiary of Nippon Telephone), and Qwest follow. Id.
73 KENDE, supra note 13. "It is important to differentiate between larger backbones
refusing to interconnect with smaller backbones, versus the larger backbones only
refusing to peer with smaller backbones. Instead of peering with the smaller backbones,
the larger backbones may offer them a transit arrangement." Id.
74 Id. ("In a competitive market, a backbone may refuse to peer with a smaller rival
for legitimate rather than anti-competitive, reasons.").
75 Id. ("[Clompetition among the larger top-tier backbones gives them an incentive
to provide transit arrangements to smaller backbones in place of peering.").
76

Id.
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however, that may contribute to a finding of market power even if
the computed market share typically would not point toward
monopolization or market domination. A firm may exercise
market power by engaging in practices that adversely impact
competitors, the robustness of competition, and consumer welfare.
The potential for such adverse effects increases when competitors
need to collaborate on the joint provision of a service, or when
competitors need to rely on access to the facilities or services of
another competitor to assemble all the elements necessary for a
complete service. Internet service provision requires both
collaboration (network interconnection) and cooperation (access
by small ISPs to the backbone trunks of Tier-I ISPs on fair, costbased terms and conditions).
Decisions by Tier- I SPs not to collaborate or cooperate may
result from legitimate business decisions or may constitute an
anticompetitive practice. The refusal to interconnect facilities may
constitute a "concerted refusal to deal."" In antitrust jurisprudence,
this practice refers to an attempt to drive a competitor out of
business or to raise its cost of doing business, resulting in the
reduction of marketplace attractiveness.78 Even if a Tier-i ISP
continued to permit lesser ISPs to interconnect, the terms and
conditions might constitute a "price squeeze, '79 an attempt to raise
77 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). A boycott or a company's organized refusal to deal
constitutes one of the core anticompetitive practices deemed illegal by section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Id.
78 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984) (citing
United States v. Parke, Davis, & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); United States v. Colgate &
Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)) ("A manufacturer generally has a right to deal, or refuse
to deal, with whomever it likes, as long as it does so independently."). However, joint or
concerted action might well violate antitrust laws. See, e.g., United States v. Scuba
Retailers Ass'n, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 45,096 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (discussing a trade
association of scuba equipment retailers trying to curtail mail order sales).
79 A price squeeze involves "a situation where a firm manipulates the input and
output prices faced by a competitor to prevent that firm from competing effectively."
William B. Tye, The Price of Inputs Sold to Competitors: A Response, 11 YALE J. ON
REG. 203, 212 n.24 (1994). In telecommunications and Internet markets, some
competitors may need to lease the facilities or services of a competitor. For example, a
small ISP typically secures long-haul, broadband transmission capacity used for transit
services from a larger, Tier-I ISP. If the larger ISP raised its transit charges but did not
raise rates for similar services it provides directly to end-users, it might be deemed to
have engaged in a price squeeze by deliberately raising the costs incurred by rivals. See,
e.g., Debra J. Aron & Steven S. Wildman, Effecting a Price Squeeze Through Bundled
Pricing, in COMPETITION, REGULATION AND CONVERGENCE: CURRENT TRENDs IN
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competitors' costs and lower their marketplace attractiveness by
increasing the cost of an essential facility," bottleneck," or service
element needed by the lesser ISP to provide a complete end-to-end
service. ISPs with superior bargaining power may also leverage
this power to extract concessions from lesser ISPs, including
agreements not to compete in certain service or geographical
markets, setting a price floor on the service offered by the lesser
ISP, or tying access to a desired service, such as tying long-haul
backbone trunks to a commitment to buy or lease less desired and
competitively provisioned services. 2 Tier-1 ISPs may attempt to
enforce these anticompetitive restraints by threatening to drive
noncompliant lesser ISPs out of business with predatory prices,
deliberate below-cost rates, or threats to raise or eliminate access
opportunities.
The potential for anticompetitive practices and leveraging
bottlenecks exists in both the aviation and Internet industries.
Absent government ownership or effective regulation in the
aviation industry, the airport operator could discriminate in favor
of one particular airline in the manner in which it assigns (or
denies) access to space in the airport terminal and opportunities to
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH (Sharon Gillette & Ingo Vogelsang eds.,
1999).
80 An essential facility is so important to the free flow of commerce and public
policy concerns that courts mandate access even though it may be privately owned. The
essential facility doctrine originally covered physical assets such as railroad bridges.
United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 394-97 (1912). It now extends to
intangible resources including the common carrier telecommunication facilities of
competing carriers. MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1131-33
(7th Cir. 1983) (requiring AT&T to interconnect its facilities with a long distance
telephone service competitor).
81 A bottleneck constitutes a potential choke point in the flow of commerce. In
telecommunications and Internet traffic, a bottleneck exists where traffic tends to back
up due to congestion or limitations in the ability of the facility to handle the volume of
traffic sent. Robert B. Friedrich, Regulatory and Antitrust Implications of Emerging
Competition in Local Access Telecommunications: How Congress and the FCC Can
Encourage Competition and Technological Progress in Telecommunications, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 646, 659 (1995); see also Mark Cooper, Open Access to The
Broadband Internet: Technical And Economic Discrimination in Closed, Proprietary
Networks, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 1011, 1013-14 (2000); Michael T. Osborne, The
Unfinished Business of Breaking Up "Ma Bell:" Implementing Local Telephone
Competition in the Twenty-first Century, 7 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4 (2000), at http://
www.richmond.edu/jolt/admin/v7i 1/note 1.html.
82 Piraino, supra note 49, at 824.
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take off or land aircraft. In the Internet industry, access to the local
loop and backbone networks of Tier-1 carriers may be viewed as
constituting essential facilities whose access terms and conditions
could choke off or stimulate competition. 3 To the extent lesser
ISPs do not have alternatives to Tier-1 ISP backbone trunks, the
lesser ISPs may have to comply with unilateral or collective
policies designed to manage competition. Tier-1 ISPs, however,
can exercise market power only if their single or collective
(collusive) behavior forecloses competitive alternatives. Whether
Tier-i ISPs can force lesser ISPs to comply with unilaterally set
terms and conditions on such key matters as interconnection and
transit pricing depends on the lesser ISPs' alternatives.
Alternatives may include self-help, the construction and operation
of their own backbone facilities, or the lease of such facilities from
telecommunication carriers who do not also operate as Tier-1
ISPs.
A. How Might Anticompetitive PracticesOccur: Tier-i ISPs
Bear Limited Regulatory Burdens
Tier-1 ISPs might have the opportunity to engage in
anticompetitive practices because of lax antitrust or competition
policy enforcement and a general predisposition not to regulate the
Internet."4 Additionally governments might not consider matters
such as interconnection and peering policy as constituting
anticompetitive practices. In this examination of how extensively
governments engage in regulatory oversight, the analogy between
ISPs and commercial airlines breaks down somewhat.
ISPs incur substantially less government oversight than their
airline counterparts for four primary reasons. First, governments
regulate the telecommunications transport function performed by
the carriers who lease facilities to Tier-1 ISPs 5 Second,
83

See supra note 80 and accompanying text.

84 See, e.g., OXMAN, supra note 13; President William J. Clinton & Vice President
Albert Gore, Jr., A Framework For Global Electronic Commerce (1997), at
http://www.ecommerce.gov/framewrk.htm (articulating the beliefs that "the private
sector should lead," "governments should avoid undue restrictions on electronic
commerce," and "where governmental involvement is needed, its aim should be to
support and enforce a predictable, minimalist, consistent and simple legal environment
for commerce").
85 For example, the European Union, in Council Directive 90/387/EEC, art. 3, 1990
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notwithstanding its growing importance, the Internet has not
approached the status of public utility or functional equivalent of
telecommunications.86 Third, most governments have purposefully
embraced a hands-off strategy with an eye toward promoting
entrepreneurialism and private initiatives." Finally, until recently
ISPs themselves have emphasized connectivity and global reach
even if the network interconnection, access, and pricing policies
employed to reach that goal (open peering and Sender Keep All)
reduced profitability and resulted in the possibility that some ISPs
would bear disproportionately greater financial burdens to build up
the network infrastructure than others. "
III. Rationale for Regulatory Asymmetry Between
Telecommunications Regulation and Internet Unregulation
In the past, national regulatory authorities have adopted an

O.J. (L 192) 1, 2, establishes baseline principles that facilities-based telecommunication
carriers must apply when leasing lines and interconnecting with enterprises providing
value-added services. While the carriers negotiate terms and conditions in a commercial,
arm's length atmosphere, Open Network Provision principles direct the providers of the
underlying transmission capacity to offer access on terms and conditions based on
criteria that are objective and transparent, that are published in an appropriate manner,
and that guarantee equal and non-discriminatory access in accordance with Community
law. Gunter Knieps, Interconnectionand Network Access, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 90, 92
(2000).
86 Mark Schankerman, Symmetric Regulationfor Competitive Telecommunications,
8 INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 55 (1996). Regulatory asymmetry can work when the products
or services involved do not constitute functional equivalents. However, proliferating and
developing Internet services have begun to include features that consumers may consider
as unregulated substitutes for regulated telecommunication services, such as Internet
telephony. "In general terms symmetric regulation means providing all suppliers,
incumbents and new entrants alike, a level playing field on which to compete: the same
price signals, the same restrictions, and the same obligations .... But all forms of
asymmetric regulation contain an intrinsic bias toward some firms or technologies ....
Id.
87 Sam Paltridge, Working Party on Telecommunications andInformation Services
Policies, Internet Traffic Exchange: Developments and Policy, Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, DSTI/ICCP/TISP/98(l) (1998), at
http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/cm/prod/traffic.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2001). "In the
newly liberalized environment for international infrastructure, provision regulators
would, no doubt, be loath to intervene in the commercial negotiations between ISPs.
Moreover, it is not easy to discern what would be the consequences of such
intervention." Id.
88 See, e.g., KENDE, supra note 13.
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inconsistent and dichotomous regulatory regime as between the
Internet and telecommunications. Internet access issues currently
lack a regulatory forum because governments have largely
refrained from interfering with a commercial, self-regulating
system. Accordingly, the national telecommunications regulatory
authorities typically lack jurisdiction to adjudicate an Internet
access dispute unless the complainant characterizes the dispute in
the context of a refusal to provide a telecommunications service by
a carrier with a legal obligation to do so.89 Other adjudicators,
including courts, may provide a substitute forum, but it may prove
helpful to explore the reason why governments have refrained
from creating a uniform regulatory regime and forum for
addressing both telecommunications and Internet disputes.
A. The Internet Is Considereda Contestable or Competitive
Market
Simply put, governments have not installed a regulatory
regime for the Internet because they do not believe that one is
needed. Advocates for regulatory relief on Internet access issues
will dispute this by emphasizing the need for closer antitrust or
competition policy scrutiny using a better calibrated market
definition.9" Advocates for Internet access relief allege that the
consolidation in the long-haul market segment accords Tier-1 ISPs
the power to distort the bargaining process and to extract
"supracompetitive," overly generous compensation for access to
and transit through their networks.91 These advocates believe the
competitive playing field has tilted in favor of Tier-i ISPs who
can exploit the inelastic demand for their transport service and the
content they have available.92 Some Internet access relief
advocates would characterize the Tier-1 ISP networks as "essential
89 Id. Internet Service Providers typically do not incur the same regulatory burdens
as common carriers and face no legal obligation to provide service on terms and
conditions as a public utility. Id.
90 Id. ("The Asia-Pacific carriers have argued that, based on their equation of traffic
flows to benefits, U.S. backbones should share the cost of the transmission capacity
between the Asia-Pacific region and the United States, a system that would essentially
impose legacy international regulations on the Internet.").
91 Id. Supracompetitive refers to prices that exceed what a competitive marketplace
would generate.
92

Id.
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facilities"93 and "bottlenecks," because all long-haul Internet traffic
must traverse these facilities in much the same way as this traffic
might have only one local loop routing option provided by an
incumbent local exchange carrier monopoly. If governments
adopt the view that Tier-1 ISP networks constitute essential
facilities or bottlenecks, then these governments have an economic
and legal rationale for applying regulatory instruments aimed at
"improving" the terms and conditions for access, including the
interconnection or access charges imposed by Tier-1 ISPs on
smaller ISPs.
Notwithstanding market consolidation by the Tier-1 ISPs,
governments have yet to adopt the view that the long-haul Internet
access marketplace is oligopolistic and uncontestable. First,
absolute denial of access to Tier-i ISP facilities apparently has not
occurred. Advocates for government intervention dispute the terms
and conditions for such access, not that they lack access
93 The "essential facility" doctrine in antitrust or competition policy supports
government intervention to mandate access by competitors to a facility or service
provided by one competitor based on the following assumptions: (1) that the competitor
has the ability to exert monopoly power over the essential facility, such as the ability to
deny access or provide discriminatory access, including the imposition of higher access
rates on competitors, thereby leading to a price squeeze; and (2) that competitors cannot
practically or reasonably duplicate the facility. Daniel Glasl, Essential Facilities
Doctrine in EC Antitrust Law: A Contribution to the Current Debate, 15 EUR.
COMPETITION L. REV. 306 (1994); William B. Tye, CompetitiveAccess: A Comparative
Industry Approach to the Essential FacilityDoctrine, 8 ENG. L.J. 337, 346 (1987). But
cf., Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities:An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1990) (discussing when and why the essential facilities doctrine
should be limited); Allen Kezsbom & Alan Goldman, No Shortcut to AntitrustAnalysis:
The Twisted Journey of the 'EssentialFacilities'Doctrine, 1996 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1
(1996).
94
Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. and
Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 21-22 (1980) (First Report and Order).

A firm controlling bottleneck facilities has the ability to impede access of its
competitors to those facilities. We must be in a position to contend with this
type of potential abuse. We treat control of bottleneck facilities as prima facie
evidence of market power requiring detailed regulatory scrutiny. Control of
bottleneck facilities is present when a firm or group of firms has sufficient
command over some essential commodity or facility in its industry or trade to
be able to impede new entrants. Thus bottleneck control describes the structural
characteristic of a market that new entrants must either be allowed to share the
bottleneck facility or fail.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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opportunities. Similarly, no evidence supports the view that Tier-I
ISPs have conspired or coordinated efforts to fetter smaller ISPs
with discriminatory Internet access terms and conditions. Tier-1
ISPs operating in the United States now require access and transit
payments from smaller ISPs, regardless of their location.
However, the imposition of higher, distance-sensitive charges on
ISPs operating outside of North America and far from a Tier-1
ISP's Point of Presence imposes a comparatively greater financial
burden than that borne by closer ISPs. Lastly, no indication exists
that Tier-i ISPs have engaged in a strategy to raise smaller ISPs'
costs of doing business with an eye toward driving them out of the
market. Tier-1 ISPs have not entered markets with lower predatory
rates.
The strongest case for government intervention lies where selfcorrecting marketplace outcomes cannot be relied upon to remedy
short-term problems.
A cautious approach would be to reject any possibility of
mandatory access except where it is 'essential' to the existence of
competition. If applicants for access can plausibly invent around
the network monopoly, establish their own competitive networks,
or join other networks that may not be equivalent but are
acceptable alternatives to the dominant network, any consideration
of court-ordered access may be eliminated."
Advocates for a "hands-off' approach to Internet access issues
emphasize the suitability of marketplace remedies, as
discriminatory or unfair access terms and conditions should
generate incentives for smaller ISPs to set up their own
competitive networks or collectively join with other smaller ISPs
to create a rival long-haul network.96 Likewise, they consider the
profits accruing to Tier-1 ISPs appropriate rewards for risk-taking

95 Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Analysis in High-Tech Industries: A 19th Century
DisciplineAddresses 21st Century Problems, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 129, 138 (1999);
see also David J. Teece & Mary Coleman, The Meaning ofMonopoly: Antitrust Analysis
in High-Technology Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 801 (1998) (discussing the reasons
that current antitrust analytical frameworks could hurt innovation).
96 KENDE, supra note 13 ("Any regulation of the Internet backbone market would
represent a significant shift in the unregulated status quo under which the Internet
industry has grown at unprecedented rates, and therefore would require a corresponding
significant shift in the competitiveness of the market.").
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and achieving marketplace success.97 Expropriating some or all of
the monetary fruits of Tier-i ISPs' labors simply rewards free
riders and risk-averse players. Also, a hands-off approach would
free government of the difficult, if not impossible, task of
resolving equity and operational issues for which government has
no particular skill or impartial template.98
IV. Applying Antitrust or Competition Policy to Three NearTerm Marketplace Scenarios
Three near-term marketplace outcomes may occur in the
Internet access dispute: (1) the status quo may be extended; (2)
Tier-1 ISPs may consolidate network management in ways similar
to how telecommunication carriers manage deployment of
international satellite and submarine cables; and (3) rapid
deployment of additional long-haul transmission capacity may
lead to a robustly competitive marketplace, making bandwidth a
tradable commodity.
A. Scenario One: The Status Quo Continues
Reasonable people can disagree as to whether the status quo
raises legitimate antitrust or competition policy concerns.
Concentration of ownership and control over long-haul bandwidth
can create both incentives and opportunities for operators of such
essential facilities to act in a cartelized and anticompetitive way.
No coordinated behavior has become evident, however, nor does it
appear that the unilateral decision of any one or more Tier-I ISPs
can have a markedly anticompetitive impact on the market for
Internet transport and access to Internet-mediated services and
content.
One might conclude that Tier-I ISPs have raised the cost of an
essential service element to competitors, thereby demonstrating
that the Tier-i ISPs have engaged in an illegal price squeeze.
However, one could just as well conclude that the international
data transport marketplace segments into backbone, long-haul
97 Id. at 39 ("[Clompetitive pressures and responses
competition in the Internet industry and make any international
interconnection unnecessary.").
98 Leonard W.H. Ng, Access and InterconnectionIssues in
Full Liberalizationof European Telecommunications, 23 N.C. J.
1, 30 (1997).

are the hallmark of
regulation for Internet
the Move Towards the
INT'L L. & COM. REG.
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carriage, and regional or local carriage. Under this sort of market
segmentation, Tier-1 ISPs in effect do not compete with smaller
ISPs, nor do they take over their local markets. A decision to raise
access and transit fees would not constitute a price squeeze, in part
because the Tier-1 ISP does not intend on predatorily driving
smaller ISPs out of the market so that the Tier-1 ISP might expand
its market and geographical reach. In a nutshell, the status quo has
generated major disputes because different stakeholders perceive
the Internet marketplace differently. Without a shared baseline in
terms of market definitions, inferences and extrapolations will
differ, particularly as to whether universally understood
anticompetitive practices have occurred.
1. Arguments That Anticompetitive PracticesHave
Occurred
Proponents of regulatory and other types of relief to Tier- I ISP
peering policies argue that prices to smaller ISPs have increased
without justification. Tier-1 carriers need not meet in a smokefilled room to collude or engage in a conspiracy. The term
"conscious parallelism" refers to uncoordinated, but identical,
pricing decisions and other decisions made by erstwhile
competitors.99 This practice frequently occurs in commercial
aviation as carriers signal pricing strategies implicitly through
their ticket reservation systems. A carrier seeking to raise rates
hopes that competitors will match the fare increase, thereby
making the initiating carrier's rate increase "stick." Should the

99 Basically, the doctrine of conscious parallelism establishes a means by
which a tacit agreement or understanding in restraint of trade may be proven.
Under this doctrine, if certain competitors engage in a course of conduct that
would be detrimental to any one of the competitors if such competitor acted
alone and is beneficial to all of the competitors if such conduct is undertaken by
all, then it may be inferred that the competitors agreed to undertake such
conduct. Frequently, this commonality of interest in all competitors
undertaking the same course of conduct is referred to as "interdependence."
Conrad M. Shumadine et al., ANTITRUST AND THE MEDIA, 582 PLI/Pat 229, 418-19
(1999); see also Patrick Bolton et al., PredatoryPricing: Strategic Theory and Legal
Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239 (2000); James E. Meeks, Predatory Behavior as an
ExclusionaryDevice in the Emerging Telecommunications Industry, 33 WAKE FOREST L.

REv. 125, 131 (1998) (viewing predatory pricing in strategic terms, dominant-firm price
cutting that raises entry barriers and harms potential competition is anticompetitive when
it appears probable that the low pricing will not be maintained if entry is deterred).
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other carriers not follow up with the same rate hike, the initiating
carrier typically lowers its rates to the previous level. Conscious
parallelism alone does not sufficiently prove a conspiracy and
violation of the Sherman Act. "0
Tier-i ISPs can conspire to raise the costs of their data
transport access and transit service though a series of seemingly
unilateral decisions. While one Tier-i ISP may have initiated the
decision to abandon public peering, it could not have made this
decision stick unless and until all other Tier-i ISPs executed the
same change in peering policy. Absent a cost-based or demandbased justification, the decision to change peering policies may
evidence a decision by the Tier-i ISPs to foist costs onto other
ISPs with an eye toward bolstering the Tier-i ISPs' profitability
and market dominance. This attempt to dominate, if not
monopolize the data transport marketplace, should trigger antitrust
or competition policy safeguards designed to protect consumers
and competitors from attempts to tilt the competitive playing field
in favor of one select group of market players.
2. Arguments That Anticompetitive PracticesHave Not
Occurred
Tier-i ISPs justify their revised peering policy as a rational
and cost-based response to changed circumstances. The Internet
has largely made the transition from infant industry incubation to a
maturing and commercializing private industry. The largest ISPs
can no longer ignore differences in ISP size, traffic streams,
amount of bandwidth available, subscriber population, number of
peering or interconnection sites, and scope of content hosted. ISPs
have had to wean themselves from government subsidies, and they
now have to pay closer attention to the requirements and
expectations of their investors.
Greater sensitivity to the bottom line requires ISPs to
scrutinize telecommunication transport costs and to determine
whether they have borne a fair, and not excessive, share of costs.
This attention has triggered greater vigilance against free riding,
100 Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954)
("[T]o be sure, business behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence from which the
fact finder may infer agreement. But this Court has never held that proof of parallel
business behavior conclusively establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that such
behavior itself constitutes a Sherman Act offense .... ).
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which in this context refers to "the previous ability of smaller ISPs
to exploit public peering for access to bandwidth, content, network
functionality, and transit services . .

in excess of what they

contribute for use by other ISPs and their subscribers."'"' The
decision to change peering policies and to shift the financial
burden responds to the legitimate and reasonable rebalancing of
the data transport financial burden. Because North American ISPs
have contributed to the creation and hosting of keenly desired
content and have upgraded their networks to provide pathways
capable of handling multimedia applications, they have a
commercial opportunity to "recoup their investment and to capture
the fruits of their labor."'' 2 Accordingly, a change in peering policy
reflects the need to recover increasing network infrastructure
upgrade costs and to charge what the market will bear given the
inelastic demand for the content they host and the network access
and transit services they offer.0 3
B. Scenario Two: Tier-i ISPs Behave Like Their
Telecommunications CarrierCounterparts
The second near-term scenario involves the cartel-like
behavior in which international telecommunication carriers have
historically engaged, albeit at a decreasing and unsustainable
level.' This view sees an ironic outcome: just as the international
telecommunications
marketplace
becomes
increasingly
competitive, robust and open consolidation among Tier-i ISPs
makes the backbone data transport market increasingly
concentrated, managed, and cartelized.'°5 While market
concentration and high market share alone do not signal an
anticompetitive market, the incentive, and perhaps the opportunity,
10! James Savage, Robert Frieden, & Timothy Denton, International Charging
Arrangementsfor Internet Services/Module 3: The Final Report, ch. 4 (Mar. 2000), at
http://www.tmdenton.com/InternetCharging/icais3.htm (third report of a comprehensive
analysis of international charging arrangements for Internet access (ICAIS) performed
for the Telecommunications Working Group of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
Telecommunications Committee). The term ICAIS is a label for the issue of "who should
pay, and how much." Id. at ch. 1.
102 Id. at ch. 4.
103

Id.

104

Id.

105 Id.
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to engage in such practices increases.
Tier-I ISPs may choose as a frame of reference the "old
school"
and
"clubby"
international
telecommunication
environment that served as the predominant industrial model from
the onset of telegraphy to the late 1980s." 6 During that time period,
international submarine cable consortia and international or
the
cooperatives
largely
managed
regional
satellite
telecommunication marketplace.' 7 Management refers to the
carriers who collectively made facilities deployment decisions,
going so far as to allocate usage between cable and satellites. 8
This management process emphasized carrier convenience,
conservation of capital, and risk sharing over consumers' interests,
entrepreneurship, and the considerable benefits of competition. 9
Centralized management may seem anachronistic and
ludicrous in this time of privatization, liberalization, deregulation,
competition, and globalization. But we should note that these
descriptive characteristics of the telecommunication marketplace
have appeared only recently. Few incumbents would willingly part
with guaranteed market share and a quiet life in exchange for
potentially greater upsides, but substantially more volatility, risk,
uncertainty, and hard work. Tier-1 ISPs manage to acquire market
share though "superior business skills, efficient operations, the
first to market ('early mover') advantage and access to plenty of
capital to fund growth.""' In addition, these ventures benefit from
opportunities to buy market share through strategic mergers and
acquisitions."' Having secured a dominant market share, the Tier-I
ISPs have every incentive to try to sustain their comparative
advantage and to perpetuate their market dominance.

15
106 See ROB FRIEDEN, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS HANDBOOK
(1996); Lawrence J. Spiwak, From InternationalCompetitive Carrierto The WTO: A
Survey of the FCC'sInternationalTelecommunications Policy Initiatives 1985-1998, 51
FED. COMM. L.J. 111 (1998).

'07FRIEDEN, supra note 106, at 15-16.
108Id. at 53, 105.
109 See id.

at 54, 105-06.

110Savage, Frieden, & Denton, supra note 101, at ch. 4.
I Id.
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1. Arguments That Anticompetitive PracticesHave
Occurred
The rationale that Tier-1 ISPs will sustain their marketplace
dominance is based primarily on the view that they must take
affirmative and anticompetitive steps to foreclose outsiders and
smaller ISPs from bringing technological and other innovations to
market. This view parallels the charge that the Microsoft
Corporation violated antitrust or competition policies to sustain its
monopoly." 2 Faced with the potential for lost market dominance in
either their core market (personal computer operating systems) or
developing markets (World Wide Web browser software),
Microsoft allegedly engaged in predatory and strong-arm tactics."3
The company offered a free Web browser where consumers
previously had to buy it; this constituted possible evidence of
predatory pricing."' The company also allegedly forced personal
computer manufacturers to feature this software as a condition for
the opportunity to buy the more intensely desired Windows
operating system.'
Collectively, the alleged activities of
Microsoft worked to extend its market dominance by leveraging
inelastic demand for access to its computer operating system to
secure market dominance in a new and heretofore separate market
for Web browsers."6
Tier-1 ISPs can sustain their market dominance by leveraging
the inelastic demand for their hosted content.'" One could argue
that Tier-1 ISPs tie this demand with the somewhat more elastic
demand for data transmission capacity, with the result that smaller
ISPs incur a comparatively higher financial burden. But even if a
tying arrangement" 8 does not exist, because Internet charging
112 See United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft I11), 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19
(D.D.C. 1999) (findings of fact); see also Piraino, supra note 49, at 812-19, 840.
"13 See Microsoft 111, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 37, 64-70, 111-12.
"14

Id. at 44-45.

"M

Id. at 58, 69.

116 See id. at 69; Piraino, supra note 49, at 824.

Savage, Frieden, & Denton, supra note 101, at ch. 4.
"A tying arrangement arises when a seller conditions the sale of one product or
service (the tying product) on the purchase of a separate product or service (the tied
product)." Dustin Rowles, Legal Update, Is it a Tie-In or an Integration? U.S. v.
Microsoft Weighs In, 6 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 12 (2000), available at
http://www.bu.edu/law/scitech/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2001); see also In re Data Gen. Corp.
"17

118
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blends access to data transport and content, Tier-I ISPs have every
incentive to press their marketplace advantage by managing
deployment of Internet backbone routes and controlling access to
these essential, and possibly bottleneck, facilities.
2. Arguments That Anticompetitive PracticesHave Not
Occurred
The strongest argument that Tier-1 ISPs cannot operate as a
cartel, now or in the future, lies with the reasons that
telecommunications carriers can no longer do so. Former global or
regional satellite cooperatives like Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat
face robust facilities-based competition from in-orbit satellites
operated by private entrepreneurial ventures. "9 The traditional
submarine cable consortia comprised of incumbent carriers face
direct competition from new carrier ventures that lack the
incumbency advantage, but nevertheless find ample demand for
their state-of-the-art fiber-optic cable technology.'2 ° Simply put,
even if the Tier-1 ISPs could manage to discipline each other to
engage in cartel-like behavior, any market entry barriers they
would attempt to erect would prove impossible in thwarting
newcomers.
With the proliferation of routing options worldwide, Tier-1

Antitrust Litig., 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (upholding the rule that any
design that is cheaper for the consumer escapes antitrust liability). By requiring
customers to buy both the tying and the tied products, a monopolist extends its market
power from the tying to the tied product market. Piraino, supra note 49, at 824.
19 See Requests for Special Temporary Authority To Change Points of
Communications from Inmarsat to Inmarsat Limited, 14 F.C.C.R. 6283 (1999). Inmarsat
was privatized in April 1999, having previously spun-off ICO, Ltd., a mobile satellite
service venture currently under bankruptcy reorganization. Id. Intelsat has taken steps
toward privatization, including the spin-off in 1989 of New Skies, Ltd., a commercial
venture operating six of Intelsat's satellites. Congressional and stakeholder concerns
about a level competitive playing field slowed the process of further privatization until a
compromise was reached reflected in the Open-Market Reorganization for the
Betterment of International Telecommunications Act (the ORBIT Act). ORBIT Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-180, § 47, 114 Stat. 48 (2000). This act amends the
Communications Satellite Act of 1962 to establish a statutory framework for the
privatization of Intelsat and Inmarsat and directs the President to report to Congress
concerning the progress of privatization in relation to certain objectives, purposes, and
provisions. Id. § 47, 114 Stat. at 48, 57.
120 FRIEDEN, supra note 106, at 101.
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ISPs will not be able to discipline the marketplace.2 At least in
theory, smaller ISPs displeased with new peering policies of one
or more incumbent Tier-1 ISPs should have the opportunity to
secure backbone data transmission services from new carriers,
such as Global Crossing, Level Three, Pacific Gateway Exchange,
22
and FLAG Telecommunications.
C. Scenario Three: Long-Haul Data Transmission Becomes a
Fungible Commodity
The third scenario extends the currently experienced,
extraordinary demand for bandwidth with equally impressive
rollouts of new capacity, using state of the art circuit
multiplication technologies.' 23 While one side of the calculus may
skew the supply of data transmission capacity temporarily toward
glut or scarcity, this scenario involves a fundamental reshaping of
the industry, including the manner in which carriers provide
capacity and resellers or end-users acquire it.
In this scenario, telecommunications transport capacity
becomes fungible and tradable like bushels of corn and other
commodities. In a spot market for data transmission bandwidth,
the market has become robustly competitive, and all suppliers
have become "price takers" with no single supplier or group,
including the Tier-1 ISPs, in a position to set prices. 12 Market
price-setting in real time juxtaposes with the current model that
largely relies on "direct negotiations and significant price
differentials based on volume requirements, traffic route, and
consumer/reseller demand elasticities.' 25 In this current
environment, suppliers can price differentiate based on user
characteristics and general market conditions. A commodity
market environment operates more dynamically and in closer
relation to immediate marketplace conditions.

Savage, Frieden, & Denton, supra note 101, at ch. 4.
122 KENDE, supra note 13 ("[B]ackbones that have been denied peering can
nevertheless enter the backbone market, because competition among the larger top-tier
backbones gives them an incentive to provide transit arrangements to smaller backbones
in place of peering.").
123 Savage, Frieden, & Denton, supra note 101.
121

124

Id.

125 Id.
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1. Arguments That Anticompetitive PracticesHave
Occurred
Few situations exist where one or more suppliers can
successfully corner or manipulate a commodity market. However,
that does not suggest that players do not attempt to affect the
market, or that such endeavors do not have some kind of impact.
Anticompetitive practices that generate an impact do not eliminate
supply, but create temporary negative impacts on supply that can
quickly trigger a price increase.'26 Attempts to coordinate supply of
a commodity, like oil, do not always work, as individual suppliers
or governments have incentives to "cheat" and capture market
share at higher per-unit prices. However, efforts to discipline
suppliers can work, particularly when the number is manageable,
as is the case with Tier-I ISPs.
Even in a commodity market, suppliers may attempt to collude
and operate a cartel. Such anticompetitive practices include
attempts to fix prices, often by setting a price floor target, with
supply geared to sustain that level.' Suppliers may have some
success at calibrating supply to a target price, but such
management typically cannot work over the long term as
demonstrated by the fluctuations in commodities over time.
Antitrust or competition policy agencies may have difficulty in
policing telecommunication bandwidth markets in much the same
way as commodities futures and stock market trading create
incentives for fraud and other deceptive tactics. Tier-i ISPs may
try to run up prices in a commodity trading marketplace, but the
success of such activities depends largely on whether they can
control the options available to resellers and end-users. For
example, effective price-fixing in the submarine cable marketplace
will prove unsustainable unless equally effective price-fixing takes
place in satellite markets, as most Internet applications can use
either transmission medium.
2. Arguments That Anticompetitive PracticesHave Not
Occurred
In a market able to reflect nearly instantaneous changes in

126

Id.

127

Id. at ch. 5.

2001]

INTERNET HIERARCHY AND MULTILATERAL INTERVENTION

395

price, any significant impact on price can trigger close scrutiny.
What Tier-1 ISPs may be able to achieve in closed-door
negotiations and nondisclosure agreements, they cannot achieve
when the spot market offers such quick responsiveness. Under
these conditions, Tier-1 ISPs should be disinclined to risk
exposure and potential civil or criminal liability for attempts to fix
prices and to collude with other suppliers.
The second scenario offers Tier-1 ISPs some degree of
legitimacy to meet and manage the marketplace in ways similar to
what cooperatives do to ensure the supply of some commodities,
such as milk. A Dairy Board can meet and attempt to "stabilize"
the price of milk, complete with price floors, ostensibly to promote
the widespread availability of such an essential product, as well as
to promote the apparent public benefit of sustaining family farms.
In the third scenario, no such legitimate forum exists, and
presumably each and every supplier must respond to marketplace
conditions.
V. An Assessment of Outcomes in the Near-Term
In the near-term, a dichotomy of outcomes exists between
instances where one or more stakeholders pursue a course of
action in external forums to redress grievances, versus outcomes
where stakeholders do not undertake any external actions, relying
instead on technological and marketplace factors and their direct
involvement to remedy existing problems. 28'
A. "Do Nothing" Scenarios
Several near-term scenarios involve significant change
affecting Internet 9stakeholders without any significant steps
2
directed at redress.
The volatility of the Internet and the pace of change in Internet
market segments means that a "do nothing" approach
nevertheless will result in stakeholders facing significantly
different conditions in the months ahead. The robustness of the
Internet economy means that what had appeared unimpeachable
and unchangeable may become dislodged and upended.
Dominant market shares may become unsustainable as
128

Id.

129

Id.
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incumbents fail to sustain their technological and marketplace
leadership in the face of innovations and the next "killer
application." Already in the short history of the Internet,
ventures as large as IBM and as small, but promising, as
Pointcast (first mover in "push" technologies delivering Internet
subscribers with massive amounts of mostly unsolicited
content), have lost their opportunity to extract monopoly rents,
or at least to capitalize on first to market (so-called first mover)
advantages. "°

B. Internet Access Issues May Become Less Troublesome
The matter of Internet access has presented a problem to some
ISPs primarily because the access and transit services provided by
Tier-1 ISPs constitute a significant portion of the smaller ISPs'
operating expenses compared to other ISPs.' 3 ' Smaller ISPs and

ones operating in localities far from North America have incurred
substantially higher overall costs in doing business relative to
similarly situated ISPs in other regions.'32 One near-term scenario
presents the Internet access problem as only temporary because
the solution is available to ISPs, their government, and the
marketplace.'33
1. Changes in Traffic Flows and Market Conditions
Support Better Peering Terms and Conditions
Regardless of their geographical location, ISPs smaller than
Tier-1 operators incurred higher telecommunication transport costs
when Tier-i ISPs began charging smaller ISPs for access to the
network, thus replacing open peering arrangements. "' Tier-1 ISPs

were able to change the fundamental terms and conditions for
network connectivity because smaller ISPs needed Tier-i ISPs
more than the Tier-1 ISPs needed them. ' Any change in the
balance of power and network access needed over time will
translate into different Internet access terms and conditions.
130

Id.
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Id.
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Asia-Pacific ISPs can secure better Internet access terms and
conditions when and if demand elasticities and traffic flows trend
more closely toward parity for inbound and outbound traffic flows.
The move toward parity occurs primarily when in-region content
grows in availability and popularity and when ISPs opt to host
such content.'36 Currently, the desirability of content hosted in
North America places ISPs located elsewhere in a "demandinelastic position."'37 However, this situation does not mean that
ISPs' subscribers in Asia-Pacific regions purposefully eschew
indigenous, non-North American content. Cable television
network programmers in the region have found that their
subscribers prefer both kinds of content. ' For example, the
launching of MTV Asia resulted from the failure of the standard
North American version of the popular music video network to
gain significant market share.'39 To the extent that a market
opportunity exists for indigenous content, local programmers will
attempt to satisfy market demand over time.
Internet access relief will not, however, necessarily be the
result of less reliance on North American content. ISPs must
locate the content closer to subscribers and outside North America.
As anomalous as it may seem, currently non-North American ISPs
are penalized for locating content closer to their subscribers.' °
Despite the burden of self-provisioning lines all the way to North
America, the cost of such routing can undercut shorter and more
direct routing in-region.'' A recent article in The Industry
Standard, a widely read Internet news magazine, reported that an
Australian-based content provider has opted to locate its content in
North America because it could save forty percent in hosting and
telecommunications costs.' 2 Lower Internet access costs in North
America only bolster the incentive to host content there.
Even if Internet access terms and conditions more closely
136

Id.
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Id.
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See id.

131 See
140

141
142

id.

Id.
Id.
Stewart Taggart, Australia: Fed Up Down Under, 3 THE INDUS. STANDARD No.
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approximated a telecommunications model of equal line costsharing, telecommunication transport providers outside North
America would continue to offer comparatively less attractive and
more expensive rates. Surely economies of scale and scope
contribute to North American carriers' comparative cost
advantage. But pricing policies, particularly for local loop access,
and the comparatively less robust degree of competition factor
prominently as well.
Accordingly, changes in pricing policies and the scope of
competition might drive rates closer to North American levels.
Quite possibly, carriers outside North America can "unleash pentup demand" for Internet services by lowering access costs.' 3
Empirical evidence suggests that a reduction in end-user rates and
intermediate pricing factors, like international accounting rates,
can stimulate substantial increases in consumer demand, so that
operators can make up in volume what they lose in margins.'
2. Lower Transmission Costs Reduce Significance of the
Issue
Much of the Internet access dispute stems from the
comparatively greater percentage of total operating costs allocated
to the telecommunication transport portion in Asia-Pacific
regions.'45 According to John Hibbard, Telstra's Managing
Director of global wholesale business, "up to 70 percent of an
Australian ISP's costs are due to the international segment to the
",146
U.S.... [thereby] load[ing] up the domestic cost structure ....
The Internet access dispute may grow less troublesome thanks to
lower per-unit transmission costs to North America coupled with
the proliferation of in-region ISPs and transmission options. '
Despite the seemingly unquenchable demand for ever-expanding
bandwidth, there is a near-term future where the variety of new,
extremely high bandwidth, such as Dense Wave Division
Multiplexing fiber-optic cable projects, actually changes the
region's infrastructure supply from one of scarcity to one of at
143

Savage, Frieden, & Denton, supra note 101, at ch. 5.
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Taggart, supra note 142, at 265.
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least temporary abundance. Even if Asia-Pacific subscribers
"persisted in their preference for North American content, with
commensurate traffic routing by their ISPs, the cost of such a
'
routing topology would decline on a per unit of capacity basis."148
Reduction in reliance on North American content and routing
options would contribute to reaching closer parity in demand
elasticities.
C. A Contrary View: InternetAccess Issues May Become
More Troublesome
Despite optimism that conditions may improve and at least
partially abate Internet access concerns, the potential for the status
quo to extend into the future must be acknowledged. The financial
burden borne by smaller ISPs may grow more acute if demand for
high bandwidth applications stimulates increasing requirements,
offsetting even large reductions in per-unit costs.'49 Under this
scenario, Tier-One ISPs can maintain or increase their market
power and demand even greater compensation. At the very least,
leaving Internet access to commercial negotiations will result in
some degree of lag because certain contracts may have long terms
before coming up for renewal and renegotiation. Similarly, the
negotiation process and the balance of power in these contracts
may weigh factors other than traffic flow and transmission costs
more heavily.
1.

"Do Something" Scenarios

Because Internet stakeholders have engaged in "self-help" or
resorted to external forums for redress, several near-term scenarios
will significantly affect them. Self-help means that smaller ISPs
take affirmative steps to improve their negotiating leverage with
Tier-1 ISPs" ° Additionally, they can attempt to ventilate Internet
access issues in a number of bilateral and multilateral forums,
regardless of whether these issues lend themselves to examination,
much less resolution, in these forums. 5 '
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2. Aggrieved ISPs Pursue "Self-Help"
Smaller ISPs have every financial incentive to find ways to
minimize their reliance on Tier-i ISPs for Internet connectivity.
They can enhance bargaining leverage to seek better terms and
conditions at contract renewal time by pursuing alternatives to
contract renewals. To achieve this end, smaller ISPs should exploit
their affiliation or subsidiary relationship with a facilities-based
carrier. Integrated international carriers with an ISP affiliate or
subsidiary can efficiently load voice, data, and Internet traffic on
self-provisioned and leased lines. Additionally, the burden of
whole circuit provisioning does offer some operational
advantages. For example, in some nations, including the United
States, "the self-provisioning of circuits to a foreign point provides
greater opportunities for low cost access to the public-switched
telephone network in the foreign country without toll revenue
'
sharing or an accounting rate settlement." 52
Self-help also includes the use of technological remedies
including a recalibration of bandwidth sizing for outbound and
inbound traffic. The asymmetrical nature of Internet traffic'53 lends
itself to asymmetrical transmission pathways to and from North
America. This means that smaller ISPs need not provide an
identical amount of bandwidth when outbound traffic to North
America might require substantially less bandwidth than the return
flow; a file request of a few bytes outbound to North America can
trigger an onslaught of several hundred thousand bytes,
representing the requested content augmented by advertisements
and other commercial inducements that help support the
availability of the content."' Technical options like caching of the
most frequently viewed World Wide Web pages in local servers
can help conserve bandwidth. "
Self-help involves both unilateral and jointly undertaken
152

Id.

153 Id. Typically, far greater volume of Internet-mediated traffic travels to users than
from users. It takes very few bytes of data to request the delivery of a large file possibly
comprising millions of bytes. Id.
154 Id.

155Id. Caching involves the temporary storage of Internet content at a location that
is closer to end-users, thereby obviating the need to deliver that content over longer
distances to reach end-users. Id.
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efforts by smaller ISPs. In the latter category, Asian or Pacific
ISPs can coordinate more closely to aggregate traffic for efficient
long-haul loading to North America. In addition, they could
pursue alternative peering opportunities in-region, as well as with
other ISPs in North America willing to provide better Internet
access terms and conditions.
3. Stakeholders Seek Redress in MultilateralForums
The Internet access matter may become a subject for
examination by multilateral trade telecommunications and regional
development forums because some stakeholders have failed to
secure what they consider suitable resolution in the context of
commercial negotiations between ISPs.'56 Under circumstances
where a matter has become a chronic irritant and financial drain, it
follows that these stakeholders would seek new forums for
resolution.
4. Stakeholders Seek Redress at the ITU
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) provides a
forum primarily for setting standards, allocating spectrum,
registering spectrum, allocating satellite orbital arc usage, and
recommending policies and procedures in telecommunications." 7
This specialized agency of the United Nations lacks enforcement
powers but has proven effective because most nations recognize
the value in achieving uniform "rules of the road."'58 Over the
years the ITU has lent its "good offices" for addressing and
attempting to resolve complex and contentious issues. ' 9
In view of the convergence of telecommunications and
information processing technologies, the ITU has begun to address
matters relating to the Internet, including standard-setting for
Internet-mediated telephony and Domain Name registration."
Additionally, the ITU has addressed matters like international
156
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accounting rates that arguably have a trade policy aspect. 161
The nature of this assignment does not require consultants to
analyze whether and how the ITU would accept an invitation to
examine Internet access issues. Reasonable people could disagree
as to whether Internet connectivity, pricing, and access issues
sufficiently parallel the types of telecommunications policies
considered by and promulgated through the ITU. For example, the
ITU can legitimately address a matter like international accounting
rates because a direct link exists to tariffing, interconnection, and
telecommunication development matters clearly within its
purview.'6 2 Internet access matters do not appear to have as close
and direct a link, thus making it difficult for ITU representatives to
reach a consensus on whether to study Internet access issues,
much less promulgate recommendations on how nations should
address them.
In October 2000, the issue of Internet traffic settlements
appeared before the ITU's World Telecommunications
Standardization Assembly (WTSA)'63 that met in Montreal. The
WTSA delegates agreed to a "Recommendation"'" concerning the
161 INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, Series D: General Tariff
Principles, at http://www.itu.int/intset/itu-t/d155/d]55.htm (July 1996); see also
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION, Reforming the InternationalAccounting
Rate System, WTP Forum (1998), at http://www.itu.int/intset/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2001).
162 Id.

See INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, World Telecommunication
Standardization Assembly (WTSA-2000),
Structure of the Assembly, at
http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/wtsa/wtsa_structure.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2001). The World
Telecommunications Standard Assembly (WTSA), previously known as the World
Telecommunication Standardization Conference, addresses a wide variety of issues
relating to setting standards and uniform "rules of the road" in telecommunications. Id.
164 Thompson, supra note 157, at 287. ITU Recommendations do not generate a
binding treaty commitment. Id.
163

The Recommendation, which is voluntary, suggests that parties involved take
into account the possible need for compensation for elements such as traffic
flow, number of routes, geographical coverage and the cost of international
transmission among others when negotiating such commercial arrangements. In
addition, the Assembly agreed that while international Internet connections
remain subject to commercial agreements between operating agencies, there is a
need for on-going studies in this area.
WTSA 2000 Outcome, Report on the Outcome of the Assembly (Oct. 6, 2000), at
http://www.itu.int/newsroorrpress/documents/wtsa2000rep.htm#International
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need for providers of direct international Internet connections to
take into account in their commercial arrangements the "possible
need for compensation between them for the value of elements
such as traffic flow, number of routes, geographic coverage and
cost of international transmission amongst others."'65
While non-binding and rather general in language, the
existence of any Recommendation evidences how important this
issue is to many nations. Nations like the United States objected to
any official consideration of the issue in view of the belief that
Internet peering involves a commercial bilateral relationship.'66
Nevertheless, a compromise was drafted in the waning hours of
the Assembly.
The discussions on this very contentious issue found a positive
outcome on the last day of the Assembly. The purpose of the
Recommendation is to set out the principle according to which
there should be bilateral agreement when two providers establish a
circuit between two countries for the purpose of carrying Internet
traffic.'67 The possible need for compensation between the
providers has also been recognized. At present, when providers
install Internet circuits, they generally have a choice between the
"sender-keeps-all" or peering system of bilateral connections
when traffic is more or less balanced, or the asymmetrical system
whereby the initiating provider pays for the whole connection with
the other country (full-circuit cost).'68
5. Stakeholders Seek Redress at the WTO
The World Trade Organization (WTO) provides a forum
primarily for shaping trade policy and resolving trade disputes.'69
While Internet access issues may not fit within the scope of
responsibilities conferred to the WTO by treaty, stakeholders may
still try to recast the matter in trade terms. As with the ITU,
consultants need not analyze thoroughly whether and how the
The World Telecommunications Standard Assembly, at http://www.itu.int/
newsroom/press/documents/diii.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2001) (displaying the text of the
Recommendation).
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WTO would accept an invitation to examine Internet access issues.
As a threshold matter, a number of different outcomes might
result. First, the WTO Directorate may reject application as
outside the reach of the WTO. Second, representatives might not
reach a consensus for even limited WTO study. Third, as in the
case of international accounting rates, a "Gentlemen's Agreement"
might forestall involvement in the short term.
6. Stakeholders Seek Redress in NationalForums
Stakeholders might also pursue national forums in tandem with
a multilateral forum campaign. Even if the ITU and WTO do not
address Internet access issues, a national regulatory authority may
do so, despite the difficulty in asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction
on ISPs not operating domestically. National regulatory authorities
might attempt to unilaterally remedy perceived problems by
ordering structural and regulatory remedies, perhaps similar to the
manner in which the United States Federal Communications
Commission prescribed benchmark settlement rates for
telecommunication carriers.'7 ° Alternatively, national regulatory
authorities might pursue liberalization, privatization, and
deregulation initiatives that could stimulate competition, resulting
in downward pressure on local loop and long-haul rates. Lower
telecommunication costs should reduce Asian or Pacific ISPs'
costs and narrow the financial penalties and comparative
See 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review Reform of the International Settlements
Policy and Associated Filing Requirements, IB Docket No. 98-148, Report and Order
and Order on Reconsideration, 14 F.C.C.R. 7963 (1999); see also Policy Statement on
International Accounting Rate Reform, 11 F.C.C.R. 3146, 3146 (1996) (stating intent to
update accounting rate policies to encourage competition and technological innovation);
International Settlement Rates, 1B Docket No. 96-261, Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R.
19806, 19891, 19894 (1997) (creating four transition periods for compliance with
benchmarks and responding to the potential for expanded opportunities for one-way
bypass of an accounting rate settlement created by the Basic Telecommunications
Service Agreement); Regulation of International Accounting Rates, CC Docket No. 90337, Phase II, Fourth Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 20063, 20083, 20094 (1996)
(permitting carriers to negotiate alternatives to the traditional settlement rate system for
routes where effective competitive opportunities exist for U.S. carriers); 1998 Biennial
Regulatory Reviews Reform of International Settlements Policy and Associated Filing
Requirements, lB Docket No. 98-148, 13 F.C.C.R. 15320 (1998) (proposing largely to
abandon accounting rate scrutiny for traffic to World Trade Organization Member
nations); Rob Frieden, Falling Through the Cracks: InternationalAccounting Rate
Reform at the ITU and WTO, 22 TELECOM. POL. No. 11 (December 1998).
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disadvantages they face. Yet another scenario involves
adjudication by a national court on antitrust or competition policy
claims.
VI. Conclusion
The Internet access dispute provides a timely case study of
how important the Internet has become in terms of both
communications and commerce. Concerns about the Digital
Divide have triggered a multi-billion dollar campaign to subsidize
telecommunications and Internet access in the United States and
elsewhere.17' ISPs incurring higher access charges and their
consumers want to shape the issue in terms of equity and universal
service, not in terms of commercial negotiation and a maturing,
commercializing Internet.
Higher access costs may potentially disadvantage smaller ISPs,
as well as ISPs located far from North America and other
concentrated sources of desired content. But the nature and scope
of such disadvantage largely depends on what percentage of the
total cost it constitutes for ISPs and their customers. No one likes
to incur new and sizeable expenses without much warning and
seemingly without adequate explanation of why the prior pricing
regime created free rider opportunities that unfairly burdened large
ISPs. Absent evidence that accepted competition policy and trade
principles have been violated, however, the imposition of new
interconnection and transit charges does not warrant intervention
by multilateral forums.

171 See, e.g., NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,
Closing the Digital Divide, at http://www.digitaldivide.gov/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2001).

